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Increasing Ecosystem Services Benefits through Spatially Coordinated Land Management:  
Role of Transaction Costs and Communication in an Experimental Setting 
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The delivery of ecosystem services benefits from pro-
environmental land use and land management activi-
ties on farmland can often be substantially enhanced if 
landowners are able to coordinate their decisions across 
space. For example, in the face of pollinator popula-
tion collapse, greater crop pollination benefits will ac-
crue if neighboring farmers commit to reducing pesti-
cide usage, than if only a single farmer unilaterally 
curbs use, leaving bees vulnerable to pesticide drift 
from neighboring farms. Other examples which illus-
trate the importance of spatial coordination for gener-
ating environmental benefits across space are water 
quality improvement and biodiversity protection via 
reduction in habitat fragmentation.  
 
Regulatory agencies implementing incentive policies, 
such as the Conservation Reserve Program, can thus 
further increase the environmental effectiveness of 
public funds by rewarding spatially coordinated land 
use. Yet there are challenges. Coordination is hard. 
Often it is not possible to gauge what a neighbor will 
do and it might be best to go it alone. Even if neigh-
bors are likely to coordinate, reaching an agreement 
requires spending time, money and effort: termed 
transaction costs which can derail coordination even if 
there is the prospect of greater financial compensa-
tion. Thus, it is imperative to pilot test spatially target-
ed incentive schemes and evaluate stakeholder behav-
ior and incentive performance before costly large-
scale rollout.  
 
Experimental Design:  
 
In a recent study, we used human-subject experi-
ments (Banerjee 2015) involving university students 
August 26, 2015 
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  8/21/15 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . .  .  152.66  145.76  149.00 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  258.48  268.16  272.37 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  226.79  243.94  219.31 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  251.96  232.67  245.75 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  95.81  75.24  74.88 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  106.58  83.52  88.09 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  157.88  155.80  155.36 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  364.00  355.32  354.96 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.58  450  4.14 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  3.49  3.70  3.55 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  12.52  9.71  9.20 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6.09  6.57  5.96 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.95  2.66  2.49 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  192.50  195.00  177.00 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  100.00  85.00  85.00 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  87.50  95.00  82.50 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  97.50  136.50  139.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38.00  42.50  42.50 
 ⃰  No Market          
  
 
Statistical analysis of Phase II data (Figure 1b) where 
the transaction cost values are switched for groups in-
dicates no treatment effect. Thus, change in the cost 
setting has consequence for enrollment in the AB 
scheme for individuals who have prior experience with 
different cost values. For groups that go from high to 
low costs in Phase II, there is a significant improvement 
in enrollment (from 20% in Period 15 to 86% in Period 
16 comparing Figures 1a and 1b). But, for those whose 
participation decision is now costlier i.e., those who 
went from low to high costs in Phase II, enrollment 
rates don’t change significantly (78% in Period 15 to 
80% in Period 16 comparing Figures 1a and 1b). This is 
an interesting finding and provides evidence that sub-
jects respond to changes in their decision environment 
sluggishly – old habits are hard to break.  
 
In Figure 2, we graph a metric representing policy per-
formance defined as the percentage of spatially coordi-
nated behavior (measured as the number of instances 
in which a subject and their two neighbors selected X) 
across all groups and all periods in both Phases. Focus-
ing on Phase I, we find that AB performance is nearly 
double with low cost. Statistical tests indicate that this 
difference  is  significant  between   high and   low  cost  
 to evaluate enrollment rates and performance of a conser-
vation subsidy, called the Agglomeration Bonus (Parkhurst 
and Shogren 2007) (AB), in the presence of high and low 
transaction costs in a simple yet realistic experimental set-
ting. The AB provides a base subsidy and an additional pay-
ment (bonus) if neighboring landowners coordinate on 
similar land use decisions.  
 
Our experiments involved groups of 8 university student-
subjects who assumed the role of landowners and had the 
option to participate in an AB scheme involving two pro-
environmental land use strategies: X and Y. The subjects 
were arranged in a circle and had a neighbor each to their 
left and right. Enrollment into the scheme entailed a trans-
action cost. If subjects chose not to participate, they re-
ceived the agricultural return only, denoted by NP. If land-
owners paid the fee, they were then asked to select either X 
or Y. If both neighbors participated and selected X, the sub-
ject received more money from the AB scheme than if they 
all chose Y. While these decisions were being made, subjects 
did not know their neighbors’ choices. This experimental 
design led to uncertainty for the subjects regarding their 
neighbors’ decisions, creating a setting which is challenging 
for spatial coordination. This design choice was motivated 
by the fact that if we are able to demonstrate superior AB 
performance in a setting where spatial coordination is diffi-
cult, it is expected to perform much better when there are 
fewer obstacles.  
 
We collected data from 16 groups in which student subjects 
repeatedly interacted with their neighbors 30 times or for 30 
periods. We implemented our transaction cost variation 
treatment using a within-subject format: an individual was 
exposed to 2 cost conditions. In 8 groups for the first 15 
periods (Phase I), a low transaction cost was imposed after 
which we increased the transaction cost value for the next 
15 periods (Phase II). In the remaining 8 sessions, this cost 
ordering was reversed i.e., high cost in Phase I followed by 




Figure 1 presents the percentage of individuals who en-
rolled in the AB scheme after paying the transaction cost fee 
under the two costs conditions. Statistical tests  indicate 
that participation is significantly higher with low cost than 
with the high one in Phase I (Figure 1a). Interestingly, over 
time enrollment falls in groups where costs are high while 
the rate is more stable in the groups with lower costs. This 
result suggests that conservation agencies have to focus on 
reducing transaction costs that may deter enrollment, spe-
cifically of neighboring landowners in the current context, if 
they are to produce greater ecosystem services benefits over 
time.  
Figure 1a: Percentage of Participation in Phase I 
Figure 1b: Percentage of Participation in Phase II 
Figure 2: Percentage Performance (player and neighbors    
choose X) Pooled by Phase & Transaction Cost 
groups in the second part of the Phase i.e., coordination 
takes time and experience. This result underscores the 
challenges associated with spatial coordination. While en-
rollment is significantly higher with low costs, it is not 















In line with our previous findings about enrollment, prior 
experience with a particular transaction cost value influ-
ences policy performance as well. In groups which transi-
tion from low to high cost in Phase II, policy effectiveness 
goes down from 48% to 40%. On the other hand for 
groups that transition from high to low cost, performance 
improves from 25% to 46%. Given these performance lev-
els, statistical analysis reveals no significant difference in 
policy performance by transaction cost in Phase II. 
 
Can we improve outcomes? 
 
In our realistic decision environment, transaction costs 
deter enrollment and prevent coordination. These results 
are influenced by the prior experience subjects have with 
enrolling and coordinating in the AB scheme. So the ques-
tion is can we improve performance? Extensive research on 
coordination in experimental economics indicates that 
facilitating communication between individuals improves 
coordination. We thus ran 8 experimental sessions (with 
the same within-subject transaction cost treatment varia-
tion) where we allowed subjects to communicate with 
their two neighbors prior to deciding on their participa-
tion decisions. In keeping with the fact that messaging is 
almost always costly for the sender but not for the receiver, 
the experimental subjects had to pay a fee to send messag-
es to their neighbors. Neighbors, however, received mes-
sages for free.  
 
Figures 3 & 4 respectively present a comparative represen-
tation of the percentage of all choices (X, Y, & NP) and AB 
performance for groups with and without communication 
for the two transaction cost values. Clearly according to 
Figure 3 for both high and low costs, enrollment rates 
(taking X & Y together)  are significantly higher with com- 
Figure 3: Percentage of Choices Pooled Over Time 
with and without Communication  
Figure 4: Percentage Performance Pooled Over Time 
with and without Communication 
munication – nearly 90%. Additionally, performance 
(Figure 4) is nearly two times as high as that obtained 
without messaging. Thus, communication can facilitate 
coordination leading to spatially coordinated land man-
agement for enhanced delivery of ecosystem services and 






























Policy implications and next steps:  
 
The policy implications are clear. In the context of an AB 
scheme, if the regulator can reduce transaction costs such 
that they are low relative to the payoffs of coordination, 
then it will be easier to achieve higher environmental per-
formance via spatial coordination. However, performance 
can fall over time. Facilitating communication between 
landowners can prevent this negative result from emerging 
and lead to higher enrollments and improved policy perfor-
mance. Our study indicates that if policy makers are to 
introduce sophisticated incentive policies targeting great-
er ecosystem services delivery, they should be mindful of 
the various behaviors the policy beneficiaries may exhibit 
and the obstacles that might dampen performance. Con-
trolled economic experiments provide a low-cost means 
of obtaining key insights about these behaviors and obsta-
cles. However, we are cautious about extrapolating our 
study results  since our model is a highly  stylized  version  
of the landowners’ coordination problem. A next step in the 
policy evaluation spectrum prior to implementation would 
be to use results from the current study to benchmark hy-
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